We use data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 cohort to examine college choices. We focus in on the determinants of choosing a college at which the student is mismatched in the sense of relatively over-or under-qualified compared to other students at the same college. We find that both over-qualification and underqualification are empirically important in these data. In addition, we find that mismatch depends primarily on student choices regarding where to apply and enroll and not on college choices about whom to admit conditional on application. Most of the potential determinants we examine have a monotonic effect on college quality and so both increase the probability of under-qualification and decrease the probability of over-qualification or the reverse. In a broad sense, students with more information about college, whether from parents, neighbors or their high school peers, tend to attend higher quality colleges. An important exception to such monotonic effects is the presence of a well-matched public college within 50 miles, which reduces both under-qualification and over-qualification.
I. Introduction
Students graduating high school in the U.S. can choose to apply to and enroll in a wide variety of colleges. In this paper, we investigate how students of varying abilities sort into college of different qualities. Though we follow the literature in using the normatively loaded language of mismatch, we do not take a stand here on the causal effects of mismatch. What matters for our analysis is what students and their families believe about the causal effects of mismatch, not its actual effect.
The scholarly literature generally suggests positive effects from attending a higher quality college. In regard to academic outcomes, Bowen, Chingos and McPherson (2009) find it increases the probability of degree completion, while Bound, Lowenheim and Turner (2012) find that it reduces time-to-degree. Smith (2004, 2006) and Hoekstra (2009) and many others find that labor market outcomes such as earnings also increase with college quality, though Krueger (2002, 2012 ) offer a (partly) dissenting view. Students, of course, may or may not know about this academic literature.
Even informed students choosing what college to attend must balance the benefits of college quality against other factors. On average, higher quality colleges cost more, in some cases due to quality-based tuition gradients in state systems, in others due to the price difference between public and private colleges, in others because a higher college quality may require living farther from home. Students may also worry, as some of the literature on mismatch related to affirmative action does, about potential deleterious effects from attending a college where they have a weaker academic preparation than the other students (we term this under-qualification). Or they may imagine benefits in terms of faculty attention or participation in honors programs, from attending a college where they have a stronger academic preparation than the other students (which we term overqualification). And, of course, students may also value following their high school friends to a particular college, or attending a college affiliated with a particular church, or attending the same college their parents attended, and so on. We study the sorting of students to colleges that results from students making these tradeoffs, given the information and financial resources available to them and to their families. These choices have important implications not only for the students themselves but for the taxpayers who subsidize state universities and pay for federal and state student aid programs.
Our work builds on existing research on the extent and determinants of mismatch. Light and Strayer (2000, Table 4 ) and Black and Smith (2004, Table 4 ) document the empirical importance of both under-qualification and over-qualification in the 1979 cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. Another literature considers underqualification resulting from affirmative action, e.g. Bowen and Bok (1998) . In just the last few years, a number of studies have focused specifically on over-qualification. Some of this literature focuses specifically on application behavior, such as Avery (2010), Griffith and Rothstein (2009), Howell (2011) and Pallais (2009) , or on the recruiting efforts of elite colleges, as in Hill and Winston (2010) . Roderick et al. (2008) and Bowen, Chingos and McPherson (2009) focus on the entire process, including completion. The general picture that emerges from all of these paper is agreement on the empirical importance of both under-qualification and over-qualification, and the sense that overqualification has a lot to do with where students apply and where they attend conditional on acceptance. Less clear are the effects, if any, of mismatch on academic and/or labor market outcomes. We return in the conclusion to the literature on the effects of mismatch in the form of both over-and under-qualification.
Relative to the extant literature, we make several contributions. First, we study a nationally representative sample of college-goers from relatively recent cohort using the data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 cohort (hereinafter NLSY97).
The NLSY data have many advantages for our purposes, including a (relatively) large sample, a variety of useful covariates including student demographics, family background information and the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB). Using the restricted "geocode" data allows us to match in contextual information regarding the census district in which students reside when making the college choice (as well as giving us the data on what colleges they choose to attend) as well as features of the state college and university system they face. The restricted high school data allow us to examine the role of high school characteristics as well.
Second, we use a different and, we think, arguably superior definition of mismatch relative to other studies. Our measure focuses on the difference between a student's percentile in the ability distribution, with ability defined based on her performance on the ASVAB tests, and the percentile of the her college in the studentweighted distribution of our college quality index. Third, we separately analyze the determinants of over-qualification (weak students at relatively strong colleges) and under-qualification (strong students at relatively weak colleges). Fourth, we look at both application choices (though in less detail) and at the first college attended. Fifth, we consider multiple measures of mismatch. Finally, following Black and Smith (2006) we use a college quality index constructed from multiple variables related to college quality.
Our approach yields several important findings. First, and perhaps most surprising to us, student decisions drive mismatch in almost all cases. Most students who mismatch either do not apply to a well-matched school or apply, get admitted, but do not enroll.
Second, we find that substantial fractions of students are both over-qualified and underqualified for the colleges they attend. Third, we do not find clear evidence of higher probabilities of under-qualification for minority students, which we would see if affirmative action played a meaningful role in determining enrollment patterns. Fourth, many of the factors we examine affect the quality of college a student attends regardless of her ability, rather than affecting mismatch. Students from the wealthiest families, from neighborhoods where many adults have college degrees, and from high schools where many students go on to college are less likely to be over-qualified for their college but also more likely to be under-qualified. Fifth, and finally, features of the state university system facing the student affect the probability of mismatch. In particular, having a wellmatched public university within 50 miles decreases the probability of both over-and under-qualification.
The remainder of the paper unfolds as follows: In the next section we outline an informal model of how students and their families decide which colleges to attend.
Section III describes our data and Section IV describes our measure of student ability, college quality and mismatch. Sections V and VI present our empirical findings and Section VII concludes.
II. College choice and college mismatch
This section provides the informal theoretical framework within which we interpret our results. Our informal model draws most heavily on the formal models in Light and Strayer (2000) , Arcidiacono (2004) and Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2012) .
In reality, the process by which students are sorted into schools has several stages and involves choices by both the student and the school. The student first decides which colleges to apply to, then the colleges decide which students to admit, and finally the student chooses among her offers of admission. Students then experience the experience good and may decide to transfer to a different college or to drop out altogether. Our discussion and empirical work implicitly collapse the first two stages into a single choice by the student; we argue in Section V that the data support this simplification.
We assume that college applicants are rational and forward-looking. Nevertheless, several influences could cause a student to end up at a school that does not match her abilities, including information constraints, financial constraints, and social considerations. Lack of information on the part of either the student or the school could result in college mismatch. The student may not have complete information about the quality of different colleges, or about how her abilities compare with other college applicants. We expect that, on average, students with more educated parents, and from better educated and better off neighborhoods, and who attend high schools where more students enroll in a 4-year college, will have better information to guide their college choices. A student's application may also do a poor job of signaling her actual ability if, for example, she had a bad day on the SAT or her parents engaged pricey admissions consultants. If a college misinterprets the student's ability it may admit her to a school for which she is ill-prepared or reject her from a school that would suit her. Students may also believe, perhaps not incorrectly, that the positive effects of a higher quality college outweigh any effects of under-qualification or that the positive effects of being a big fish in a small pond outweigh any negative effects of over-qualification. In the spirit of Manski (1989) , students might try out a college for which they are over-qualified or under-qualified partly in order to learn about their optimal match.
In a basic framework where students make (what they perceive to be) the best college match they can subject to their (and their family's) budget, financial constraints will tend to push students toward schools for which they are over-qualified, because more elite schools tend to be more expensive. In practice, for strong students from low-income families the extra cost of a top school is largely offset by financial aid, but students do not know their aid offers with certainty when they are applying for schools (e.g. Avery and Turner 2009 ). Financially constrained students may also choose a nearby college to reduce travel costs or avoid the cost of boarding away from home. Again, this will tend to increase over-qualification more than under-qualification because the students have an incentive to attend a closer school even if they are over-qualified for it, but schools generally have no incentive to accept weaker students just because they live nearby.
Features of the state university system can also generate mismatch in either direction. Most state colleges offer discounted tuition to state residents, making them (often quite substantially) less expensive than other options. Also, some state colleges are required to have different admission threshold for in-state students. We expect students to trade off lower price for match quality, as they perceive it, at the margin. In addition, for some students at the top of the ability distribution in states with relatively low-quality flagships, the state system may not offer any good match.
Finally, students may appear mismatched with their college because they based their choice on other factors. Students may choose a college that is good for their major, for example engineering or art, even if it appears to be a poor match on overall quality.
Students may be recruited to colleges based on skills, such as athletics or music, not included in our measure of ability. Students may choose to go to the same college as their friends plan to attend, or their parents attended, or whose football team they like, or which provides a desired religious environment. In these cases we will code the student as mismatched, even though she may have matched well in a broader sense.
III. Data
We use the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 Cohort (NLSY97) data, which follows a recent cohort of college students. This survey, a second generation of the extensively-used NLSY79, covers a group of Americans born between 1980 and 1984.
The first interview was in 1997, with follow-up interviews each year since. The majority of the sample graduated high school and made their college choice between 1999 and 2002. 87 percent of the un-weighted sample graduated high school or got a GED. Of these high school graduates, 38 percent started at a four-year college after high school.
We focus on students who start at a 4-year college but also present analyses pooling 2-
year and 4-year college starters. Appendix Table 1 lists our sample restrictions and the associated sample losses. The NLSY97 sample includes both a representative crosssection and an over-sample of black and Hispanic youths. We combine these samples in our analyses. We use probability of inclusion (in the overall NLSY97 sample) weights, constructed by the NLSY, to combine the two samples, and also to control for differing sampling and response rates in different regions of the U.S. and by age, gender, race, and ethnicity groups.
One of the main strengths of the NLSY97 data lies in the rich set of individual and family covariates it provides. Using the restricted access geocode data provides additional information on the identities of colleges attended and allows the use of contextual information based on the respondent's residential location. Appendix Table 2 defines the variables we use in our analysis, which also include some variables from the double-secret high school survey data, which can be accessed only at the Bureau of Labor Statistics offices in Washington, DC. Many of these variables have modest amounts of item non-response. Rather than do listwise deletion of observations when an independent variable is missing, which would result in massive sample loss, we recode missing values to zero and include an indicator variable for missing values in our multivariate analysis.
We mostly use standard variables and variable definitions that do not require additional discussion here. Exceptions are the constructed ability, college quality and mismatch variables considered in detail in the next section, and the NLSY97 measures of family income and wealth. The NLSY measures these variables at a point in time, namely the 1997 interview. As a result, they get measured at different ages for different respondents. In addition, they include only income and wealth for the household in which the respondent resides. Thus, they will miss parental income and wealth entirely for older respondents with their own households as well as the income and wealth of the noncustodial spouse in the case of parental divorce. Even without these issues, the ideal measures would include both the stock of wealth at the time of the college choice as well as expected future income and wealth. The available measure falls well short of this ideal, which has implications for how we interpret the estimates from these variables in our multivariate analysis.
IV. Student ability, college quality, and mismatch

Ability
Our primary measure of student ability is the Armed Forces Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB). The ASVAB is designed for applicants to the U.S. military and was taken by most of the NLSY97 respondents as part of a norming exercise. NLSY respondents took the ASVAB during the first wave of the survey in 1997 and those who took the test were paid $75 for their time. 78% of the sample, and 84% of respondents who started at a 4year college, completed all portions of the test.
The ASVAB has twelve components, covering both the sorts of skills measured by the SAT such as algebra and geometry, vocabulary, and reading comprehension and other skills such as electronics knowledge and spatial reasoning. The ASVAB is a computer adaptive test, meaning that the difficulty of the questions asked in the latter part of each section of the test depends on how well respondents do on the initial questions in the section. The score for each section reported by the NLSY depends on both the number of questions answered correctly and the difficulty of those questions as estimated from an earlier sample of test takers. The ASVAB offers a somewhat richer measure of ability than the SAT or ACT score, and should be less influenced by variation in studying effort and preparation, since there was nothing riding on this test for the NLSY participants. 1 The ASVAB score also has the (for us) useful feature that colleges do not observe it. We can therefore capture some of the college mismatch generated by colleges having incomplete information.
When survey participants took the ASVAB, they ranged in age from 12 to 18, younger than most of the larger population taking the test. We adjust the scores for age when taking the test and then take the first principal component of the 12 section scores as our primary measure of ability, which we call ASVAB1. We calculate each respondent's percentile within the sample distribution of college-bound NLSY97 respondents, weighted by their probability of inclusion in the sample. Table 3 , the first principal component explains 60% of the total variance in test scores across the 12 sections. The first component places the highest weight on subjects like those on the SAT (or ACT): arithmetic, word knowledge, and paragraph comprehension. Not surprisingly giving the loadings, the correlation between ASVAB1 and the respondent's SAT or ACT score equals 0.81.
As shown in Appendix
The second component, which we call ASVAB2, explains a further 11% of the variance. It places the most weight on the two timed sections of the test: numerical operations and coding speed. Cawley, Heckman, and Vytacil (2001) find that the first two principal components of the ASVAB score are both relevant in determining later earnings in the NLSY 1979 sample. To construct our measure of mismatch, for which we need a single measure of ability, we use only ASVAB1. However, we include both ASVAB1 and ASVAB2 in our multivariate analyses. more thorough discussion of what the ASVAB test is measuring. We do not mind if the ASVAB also measures intrinsic motivation, as argued by Segal (2011) . More broadly, we use the term "ability" quite agnostically to mean the set of skills, innate or otherwise, that students possess around the time of the college choice.
College quality
We construct a multifaceted index of college quality by combining measures related to selectivity and college resources. In particular, we combine data from the U.S. Following Black and Smith (2004) , we use the first principal component across these four measures of quality as our quality index. Using an index based on multiple measures of latent college quality reduces measurement error relative to the single selectivity measures (usually average SAT score of the entering class) and categorical 2 US News and IPEDS collect many of the same statistics and for the same college in the same year the numbers are often identical. US News has average SAT or ACT scores for the students at a number of schools that do not report test scores to IPEDS. However, US News focuses on selective schools and excludes 2-year colleges altogether. Combining data from the two sources gives us the most complete sample of colleges. We use US News data to fill in average SAT and ACT scores and faculty/student ratios when these statistics are missing from IPEDS. Rejection rates and faculty salaries come only from IPEDS. quality ratings (e.g. from Barron's) used in much of the literature; see Black and Smith (2006) for further discussion and evidence. Our index corresponds well to a priori notions of relative quality. For example, taking one state at random, the University of Michigan lies at the 93 rd percentile, Michigan State at the 74 th , Wayne State at the 36 th , and Eastern Michigan at the 28 th . Appendix Table 4 presents the loadings.
Department of Education
This 4-factor quality index is a good measure of the quality of at least somewhat selective 4-year colleges. However, some 4-year colleges and many 2-year colleges do not report the average SAT or ACT scores for their entering classes, often because they do not require these tests as part of their applications. Our baseline measure of college quality, which we only construct for colleges with all four quality measures, disproportionally misses less selective schools. To address this problem, we also construct an alternative 6-factor measure of college quality that includes an indicator for colleges that do not report SAT or ACT scores (setting the average SAT scores to zero for those schools). This alternative index also includes an indicator for admitting all applicants; that is, for having a rejection rate equal to zero. This 6-factor college quality measure is our baseline measure for our analysis combining 2-year and 4-year college starters. We designed this measure to better measure college quality across both 2-year and 4-year colleges, but it also allows us to include students starting at 4-year schools that do not report SAT scores. Failure to report SAT scores and open admission policies both have negative weights in our college quality factor analysis, so these new schools are mostly in the lower part of the quality distribution.
Measuring mismatch
To construct our measure of student-college match, we calculate the college's quality percentile across all four-year institutions in the United States included in the IPEDS, weighted by student body size. Because we weight the quality percentile by student body size, a college in the n th percentile is the college that a student in the n th percentile would attend if you ranked students by quality of college attended. Therefore, if students sorted into schools based purely on ability and college quality, a student in the n th ability percentile would attend a school in the n th quality percentile and mismatch, defined as the difference in ability percentile and quality percentile, would equal zero for all students.
When considering both 2-year and 4-year college starters we calculate student ability percentiles across all 2-and 4-year starters in the NLSY97 sample and calculate weighted college quality percentiles using all 2-year and 4-year colleges in IPEDS and the 6-factor college quality measure.
In practice, gaps between a student's ability percentile and her college's quality percentile are quite common. Table 1A gives the joint distribution of student ability and college quality, including only 4-year college starters. Students concentrate along the diagonal, which indicates a good match, but there are also many mismatched students.
The three upper right cells, corresponding to high ability students at low quality colleges, account for 12.5% of the sample, while the three lower left cells, corresponding to low ability students at high quality colleges, account for 12.9%. Discussions of mismatch framed by concerns about affirmative action focus on the lower left corner of the distribution, and neglect the equally empirically important phenomenon of over-qualification. A comparison of Table 1A to Table 4 of Black and Smith (2004) reveals no dramatic changes in the joint distribution between the NLSY79 and NLSY97 cohorts. Table 1B presents the joint distribution using student's SAT scores and the average SAT of the entering class as the ability and college quality measures, respectively. This table reveals less extensive mismatch, as measured by the corner cells, presumably because colleges observe the student's SAT score directly but only observe proxies for ASVAB1.
The gap between the ability percentile of students and the quality percentile of the college they attend has a roughly normal distribution, shown in Figure 1 . In much of the following analysis we categorize students as under-qualified, well-matched, or overqualified for their college. We consider students to be over-qualified or under-qualified if there is a greater than 20 percentile point gap between their ability percentile and the quality percentile of the first school they attend. These cutoffs assign about a quarter of the sample to each mismatch category.
There are several sources of potential measurement error in our estimates of ability, quality, and college match. One important limitation is that we observe college quality at the school level. In practice, individual departments within a college may be better or worse than the average quality of that college. The optimal measure would combine overall university quality with department of major quality.
Another limitation is that the ASVAB provides but an imperfect measure of ability. While the ASVAB tests a richer variety of skills than most standardized tests it still does not capture all the abilities that make for a strong college student. Even if it did attempt to measure all relevant abilities, the score from a single ASVAB test would be an imperfect measure of ability because some students will perform above or below their usual level on any given day. These errors in our measurements of student ability and college quality will generate some false positives and some false negatives in our measure of mismatch.
V. Understanding the college choice
The youngest members of the NLSY97 cohort, those born in 1983 and 1984, were asked an additional battery of questions around the time they finished high school about the set of colleges to which they applied and the admission decision from each school. The top panel of Table 2 shows that just over 30% of students who ended up mismatched with their college had applied to at least one college with which they would have been well matched by our definition. Most of those students who applied were also accepted to one of those well-matched schools.
Mismatch overwhelmingly results from choices made by students and their families, not choices made by college admission departments. Of students who ended up over-qualified, 69% did not apply to any colleges with which they were well-matched.
Only 9% applied to at least one well-matched school and were rejected. The remaining 22% of over-qualified students were accepted to at least one school with which they were well-matched but chose to attend a college for which they were over-qualified. Thus, 9%
is an upper bound on the percentage of all students who end up over-qualified due to college admissions decisions. It is an upper bound because even these students had been admitted to a well-matched college some would still have chosen to go elsewhere. More broadly, even these students could have applied to more colleges; most students in our data apply to very few. Under-qualification is equally a consequence of student choices rather than college choices; less than 3% of under-qualified students applied to a wellmatched school and were rejected."
Tables 3 and 4 describe the characteristics of students and their families by the quality of college they attend and by their match category, respectively. We highlight only a few of the most important univariate patterns, saving most of our attention for the multivariate results to follow.
The patterns across the two tables are often the same. For example, in Table 3 , students attending the highest college quality quartile have more educated mothers on average than those attending lower quality colleges. In Table 4 , students who are underqualified for their college have more educated parents on average than students who are well-matched to their college, who in turn have more educated mothers than students who end up over-qualified for their college. Family wealth has a similarly monotone effect. Table 4 such as this one indicate that these characteristics influence college quality rather than mismatch, a theme that will recur in the multivariate analysis in the next section.
Monotone patterns in
We draw additional measures related to information and guidance from surveys of the high schools attended by the NLSY97 respondents. These measures have the advantage of a weaker (but not zero) correlation with family resources than parental education. We consider the share of teachers at the student's high school with advanced degrees and the share of graduates from their high school (in the class of 1999) who went on to attend a 2-or 4-year college. 3 All three variables have weak positive relationships with college quality.
VI. Multivariate analysis
This section presents the results from our multivariate analysis. We estimate probit models of over-qualification and under-qualification conditioning on demographics, multiple measures of ability, family background variables including parental education and family wealth, contextual variables related to the census region or district in which the student finished high school, variables related to the state university system and variables related to the student's high school. Both probits include all college starters.
Though we estimate reduced form specifications, we use the informal theory presented above to interpret our findings.
Baseline specification
The second and third columns of Table 5A present estimates from our baseline specification, which defines mismatch as a difference of more than 20 between the student's percentile in the distribution of ASVAB first principal components and the percentile of their college obtained using the four-factor college quality index. We estimate the baseline specification using the sample of students who start at a four-year college. In general, the results from our multivariate analysis parallel the unconditional differences presented in Table 4 .
Consider first the demographic variables at the top of the table. We find a higher probability of over-qualification for male students, but little difference in underqualification. Race-based affirmative action programs should lead to minority students being more likely to be under-qualified for their schools, conditional on their measured ability. We do not find much evidence of this effect in our baseline results for either blacks or Hispanics. In contrast, students in the "other" category, mostly Asians, have a substantially higher probability (0.08) of under-qualification and a correspondingly lower probability (-0.10) of over-qualification. We also went looking for "quality-quantity" tradeoffs as in Becker and Lewis (1973) by including the number of household members 18 years old or younger, but the data indicate they do not matter much in this context.
Ability has a mechanical effect on the probability of mismatch. Very able students will have few schools for which they are under-qualified and many schools for which they are over-qualified. The first principal component of the ASVAB scores, the measure of ability we use to define mismatch, demonstrates this mechanical effect.
Increasing a student's ASVAB1 percentile by 10 points decreases her probability of being under-qualified by about nine percentage points and increases her probability of being over-qualified by about seven percentage points.
Once we control for this first ability measure, however, the other ability measures have the opposite effect; higher high school grades, a higher percentile on the second principal component of the ASVAB scores and a higher SAT percentiles all raise a student's probability of ending up under-qualified, as defined by her ASVAB1 score, and lower her probability of being over-qualified. Thinking about the ASVAB1 variable as an error-ridden measure of each student's latent ability provides one way to think about these results. Under that interpretation, the other ability variables represent three additional error-ridden measures. Conditional on one, a higher value of each of the others suggests higher latent ability. Students and colleges observe two of these other measures, namely SAT scores and grades (and perhaps things that proxy for the third, ASVAB2), which suggests that they should also affect application and acceptance decisions, just as we find here. Put differently, a student with good grades and SAT scores may truly be a good match for a high-quality school, but we will consider her under-qualified if she scored poorly on the ASVAB. Now consider our family background variables: household wealth in 1997, starting college late, parental education, classes outside the home, and computer at home.
We include wealth in the form of indicators for quartiles, with the lowest quartile as the reference group. To our surprise, the wealth variables do not generate much explanatory action. Students from the wealthiest households have a statistically significantly lower probability of over-qualification of about 0.03, presumably reflecting their parents' ability and interest in buying their way into a good match. There is some evidence, significant at the ten percent level, of a lower probability of under-qualification at the third wealth quartile, which may represent parents too poor for full out-of-state or private tuition but too rich for much financial aid. Alternatively, it may represent selection:
Students from the bottom wealth quartile are less likely to attend college at all -in Table   2 the average college attendee is in the 3 rd quartile -but those who do may be particularly motivated or subject to some affirmative action by higher quality schools. Finally, starting college more than 12 months after graduating high school, which may be another indication of financial constraints, raises the probability of being over-qualified by five percentage points.
Not at all surprisingly, parental education plays a key role in driving college choices. We find a U-shaped pattern in regard to parental education and the probability of under-qualification. Those with the least educated parents and those with the most educated parents have the highest conditional probabilities of under-qualification; both groups exceed the omitted group -the highest parental education is completed high school -by over five percentage points. The opposite pattern holds for over-qualification, with students with the most and least educated parents having substantially lower probabilities of over-qualification. These patterns suggest a combination of disadvantagebased affirmative action at the lower end of the parental education distribution and the pursuit of college quality at the upper end. Our concerns about measurement error in the family wealth variables lead us to interpret the education variables partly as proxies for wealth, but they also surely capture differences in tastes for education among households as well as differences in information related to college application and choice.
Our final family background variables measure whether the student took courses outside of school and had a computer in the home. Other than having had courses outside of school having a negative effect on over-qualification, a result that more likely captures parental enthusiasm for education than any causal effect of such classes, we do not find much here.
Our measures of context include indicators for three of the four census regions (the Midwest is the omitted region), a rural residence indicator and variables measuring log median income and the percent of adults with four years of college in the student's census district. The region variables matter. Students in the northeast have a 16 percentage point higher probability of under-qualification and an 11 percentage point lower probability of over-qualification than students in the Midwest. Perhaps more surprisingly, students in the south and west also have lower probabilities of overqualification than those in the Midwest. We suspect that some of the regional differences in our estimates spring from regional differences in the relative importance of state and private colleges. In contrast, we find little effect of living in a rural area, though we might expect one if colleges devote less recruiting effort to rural high schools (Hoxby 2009 ).
The variables measuring income and education at the census district level both positively affect under-qualification and negatively affect over-qualification, though only the education effects are precisely estimated. These variables capture a mix of primary and secondary school quality (via residential sorting as well as voting behavior), information about college, and social pressure directed toward higher college quality.
Given the wealth of variables we condition on at the student level, the importance of the district level attendance variable surprised us.
Among the variables drawn from the high school survey, the fraction of teachers with an advanced degree has no clear effect (and a zero point estimate for underqualification). This finding comports with a large literature -e.g. Rivkin, Hanushek and Kain (2005) -that finds that teacher advanced degrees have essentially no effect on student outcomes. High school student characteristics do matter in our analysis. The probability of under-qualification increases in the fraction of students going on to either two-year colleges or four-year colleges. Both variables also decrease the probability of over-qualification, though the estimates have smaller magnitudes and less precision than for under-qualification. The fraction going to a four-year variable likely reflects better information and guidance, as well as students following their friends. The fraction going to a two-year variable we find more puzzling, though it may reflect a more select group of students, and thus a group of students more likely to under-qualify, going on to fouryear college within the high school.
The final set of covariates summarizes state higher education policy. Average four year in-state tuition at public colleges (entered in log form to allow for a non-linear relationship) decreases the probability of both under-qualification and over-qualification, thought the latter effect does not attain statistical significance. This pattern may indicate that states with relatively high four-year tuition do a better job of matching students to colleges, perhaps because the system offers more choices of quality and location or it may be that higher in-state tuition pushes students at the margin toward better matches in the private sector or in other states. The negative effect on over-qualification may result from high four-year college prices pushing some students to be over-qualified at a twoyear school rather than at a four-year school.
A more obvious interpretation follows our finding that having a public four-year that is a good match within 50 miles (and within the state) leads to almost a five percentage point decrease in the probability of over-qualification. This suggests that a desire to live nearby, whether to save money by living at home or to stay near family and high school friends, plays a key role in driving over-qualification. The effect on underqualification is small and not statistically significant, but in the expected sign, as students may trade off quality and distance to college at the margin. Similarly straightforward to understand is that having a matched private within 50 miles reduces the probability of over-qualification as well, by nearly five percentage points. Students make tradeoffs between tuition, travel and boarding costs, and quality at the margin in reasonable ways.
Less easy to interpret is the strong positive effect of having a well-matched private college within 50 miles on the probability of under-qualification, which it reduces by 0.106.
Poking and prodding the baseline specification
We conducted a wide variety of sensitivity analyses related to our baseline specification, a handful of which merit explicit mention here. Our first sensitivity analysis replaces the four-factor college quality index with the six-factor index. The right-hand columns of Table 5A display the results of this exercise, which largely parallel those from the baseline specification. In what follows, we focus just on the small number of interesting differences. First of all, we find a substantively and statistically significant difference in the probability of under-qualification for blacks in this analysis. The change in sign and statistical significance suggests affirmative action operating at the margin between somewhat selective and non-selective 4-year schools. Second, census district income matters relatively more here and census district education relatively less.
Changing to the six factor index not only changes our measure of college quality and thereby of mismatch, it also enlarges the sample by several hundred observations. To sort out the separate effects of the change in index and the change in sample, Table OA-1 in the online appendix repeats the six-factor analysis in Table 5A using the only the observations from the four-factor analysis. With one exception, not much changes from Table 5B , indicating that most of the changes when moving from the four-factor to the six-factor quality index have to do with the index, not the sample. The exception has to do with the black and Hispanic effects, which loom large when restricting the sample to those with the four-factor index. This indicates the relative importance of non-selective 4year colleges for this group.
We also experimented with several other definitions of mismatch. The next subsection considers two ways of defining mismatch in terms of individual and college SAT scores. Appendix Table OA-2 presents results from defining mismatch as in Table   5A , but with 10 and 30 percentile point differences, rather than 20. Changing the cutoff used to define mismatch does not change the qualitative findings.
We obtained estimates for various subsamples and subgroups of interest. To test the sensitivity of the results to removing students who could not be over-qualified under the 20 percentile point definition because their ASVAB percentile was too low, or who could not be under-qualified because it was too high, we repeated the analysis using only students with ASVAB percentiles in (20, 80) . Restricting the sample in this way does not change the qualitative results as shown in Table OA -2. Inspired by Das and Imberman (2012) we repeated the analysis excluding students at private universities. Table OA-3 reveals that this, too, does not change the qualitative findings. Noting that Smith (2004, 2006) perform their analyses separately for men and women, we thought we should too. Table OA-4 presents those results; once again, the qualitative patterns, much to our surprise in this case, do not change. We also looked at subgroups defined by race / ethnicity and by parental education. In both cases, the subgroup results (which we do not report) paralleled the results for the full sample in Table 5A .
Concerned about interpreting the results from multiple measures of ability all conditional on one another (i.e. ASVAB1, ASVAB2, high school grades and SAT score in the baseline model), we estimated a model including only one ability measure, namely ASVAB1. As revealed in Table OA -5, this does not change the qualitative results.
Concerned about the NLSY97 wealth measure, in Table OA-6 we estimated specifications including wealth in log form, rather than as indicators for quartiles, and including income, also in log form, in place of wealth. The qualitative results remain unmoved.
The final analysis we note here tests the null hypotheses that, for each variable in our empirical model, the sum of the average derivative in the probit for underqualification and the negative of the average derivative in the probit for over-qualification equals zero. In substance, this null corresponds to symmetric effects, meaning that analyses that impose symmetry do not miss much. Online appendix Table OA-7 presents these results. We reject the null for only two of the 30 coefficients at the five percent level: living in the south census region and having a well-matched public college within 50 miles. The latter we expected, the former is a case with a monotone but non-linear relationship. As we would expect to reject one or two by chance, and because underlying non-linearities in the relationship between our constructed ability and college quality indices may cloud the interpretation of the test, we do not over-emphasize these findings, but we were surprised. In an important sense, it is mostly about college quality, not mismatch.
Mismatch using SAT scores
The two left columns of Table 5B presents estimates from an alternative definition of match quality based only on the student's SAT score relative to the average SAT score of the incoming class at her college. This multivariate analysis corresponds to the joint distribution in Table 1B , discussed above. This definition of mismatch relies on an ability measure observed by colleges, so it does not capture the mismatch that arises because colleges have imperfect information about the true ability of applicants or because students misestimate their own abilities relative to other college applicants. Additionally, the SAT score embodies some of the guidance students have about applying for college if this information leads them to put extra effort into preparing for (or re-taking) the SAT or ACT exams. On the other hand, SAT scores measure ability closer to the time of college application. Because of the high stakes of the SAT, there is less risk than in the ASVAB test of under-measuring ability because students have not taken the test seriously.
Perhaps most importantly, this analysis requires that we limit the sample to students reporting an SAT score. As a result, the sample size falls from 2,125 to 1,279.
The loss comes from two different missing data processes: about half comes from students not releasing their transcripts to the NLSY and about half comes from schools not providing SAT scores on transcripts that do get released. Table 5B differ substantially in magnitude and/or precision from the corresponding estimates in Table 5A . But in only a handful of cases does the average derivative estimate attain statistical significance in the two analyses, but with different signs. We confine our remarks here to these cases. First, as expected, the mechanical effect described above moves from the ASVAB1 percentile, which now has a positive effect on under-qualification, to the SAT percentile, which now has a negative effect on under-qualification and a positive effect on over-qualification.
Many of the estimates in the SAT analysis in
Being in the south census region goes from having a positive effect on underqualification in Table 5A to a negative effect in Table 5B , possibly due to issues with the ACT to SAT score translation, though the South is a mixed SAT / ACT region. Finally, the patterns related to parental education change around a bit. In the SAT analysis, unlike the analysis in Table 5A , the probability of under-qualification increases monotonically in parental education, while the probability of over-qualification continues to have a hill shape with the maximum for students whose most educated parent is a high school completer. We lack a good explanation for this change.
Relying solely on SAT scores allows us to exploit data from the IPEDS on the inter-quartile range (IQR) of the SAT scores in the entering class at different colleges. In this analysis, we continue to use SAT scores as the measure of student ability but define mismatch for each student as having an own SAT score outside the inter-quartile range for the college. This measure captures the notion that having an SAT score different from the mean by some absolute amount means something substantively different at a college whose students have highly varying SAT scores than it does at a college where students' SAT scores cluster in a narrow band around the mean. The right-hand side of Table 5B presents the estimates using this definition of mismatch; note that we lose some observations due to item non-response for the SAT quartiles in the IPEDs data. Relative to the estimates on the left-hand side of Table 5B , the big picture of the results does not change, though various estimates move around, sometimes non-trivially, and become more or less precise. The most surprising change concerns the parental education variables, which have much less effect on the probability of under-qualification in this specification, essentially zero for students whose best educated parent has completed at least high school. We conjecture that the underlying mechanism has to do changes in who gets coded as mismatched in states with relatively weak (and thus more heterogeneous) flagships.
Including students who start at two-year colleges
In addition to attending a lower-quality 4-year college, students can also end up overqualified for their college by starting at a 2-year college. As Reynolds (2012) shows, students who start at a four-year college represent an important group, and starting at a two-year college may have an important treatment effect on the completion probability.
This section reports on what happens when we expand our analysis to include two-year starters using the 6-factor college quality index.
When we use the 6-factor measure of college quality and construct percentiles of college quality across a pooled sample of 2-and 4-year schools, 70% of the 2-year schools are in the lowest quality quartile and almost none are in the top half of the quality distribution. This broadly comports with Stange's (2012) analysis of community college quality; see e.g. his Table 1 . We present two analyses in this section. The first uses the college quality percentiles from the sample of four-year starters (i.e. the same ones as in Table 5A ) while the second re-estimates the percentiles to include the two-year schools.
Re-estimating the percentiles including the 2-year increases the amount of underlying quality spanned by a given percentile difference. This in turn means that re-estimating the percentiles will change the coding of the mismatch variables even in the top part of the distribution, as some high ability students who were more than 20 percentile points away from their college before will not be after the re-estimation.
Consider first the analysis using the percentiles defined using only the 4-year colleges, which appears in the left-hand columns of Table 5C . In general the qualitative results parallel those in Table 5A , and even the average derivatives themselves often do not change by much. We single out the most interesting changes in our discussion here.
First, note that adding in students who start at a 2-year college increases the sample size from 2,125 to 3,839 a quite substantial increase. Second, black students are now more likely to be under-qualified for their college, not less, and both black and Hispanic students are less likely to be over-qualified, a pattern consistent with affirmative action. Third, the effect of the highest parental wealth quartile on over-qualification falls by half and loses its statistical significance. Fourth, the probability of under-qualification is now (roughly) monotone in parental education, but quite non-linear, with all of the action at the margin between high school completion and some college. Fifth, and last, the percentages of the student's high school class switches from imprecisely decreasing over-qualification to strongly increasing it. This results from the fact that what in Table   5A was pushing people out of the sample now pushes them into over-qualification when we include the 2-year schools. For a similar reason, the percentage of the high school class going on to a 4-year school now has a much larger deterrent effect on overqualification.
Our final analysis, reported in the right-hand columns of Table 5C , uses the 6factor college quality index but re-calculates the percentiles of both student ability and college quality using the pooled sample of 2-year and 4-year starters. Once again, the big picture qualitative results change very little. The wealth effects become somewhat stronger at the upper end of the wealth distribution. Oddly, higher 2-year state tuition, which we include in this model for the first time, decreases under-qualification and increases over-qualification. Also oddly, 4-year tuition has a strong negative effect on over-qualification. We expected the reverse, with higher 4-year tuition pushing people to the 2-year system and thus toward over-qualification in some cases. The high school variables move around a bit, with the fraction of the high school class going to a 2-year school now, not surprisingly, more important for both over-and under-qualification.
VII. Conclusion
In a sample of recent cohort of college entrants, many students appear poorly matched with the college they attend. This mismatch is equally common in both directions; there are about as many high-ability students at relatively low-quality schools as there relatively low-ability students at high-quality schools. In both cases, this mismatch is generally the result of choices made by the student and their families, not by college admissions offices. The vast majority of students who end up mismatched with their college either did not apply to any schools with which they would be well-matched or were accepted to at least one well-matched school and chose to attend a mismatched school instead.
One plausible explanation for over-qualification is that students are financially constrained and cannot afford to attend the higher-quality colleges that would be a better match. We find some evidence to support this theory; students from the wealthiest families are less likely to be over-qualified. However, many factors that we predicted would reduce both types of mismatch instead lower the probability of over-qualification but raise the probability of under-qualification. Students with more educated parents are more likely to be under-qualified for their colleges and less likely to be over-qualified.
Factors that we think should lead students to be better informed about their college options, such as the share of graduates from their high school that go on to college, also reduce the probability that students will be over-qualified for their college and raise the probability that students will be under-qualified for their college. One way to think about this is that students and parents with more information believe that any deleterious effects of under-qualification do not outweigh the main effect of college quality in improving academic and labor market outcomes. The exception, and it is an important one, is that students with a well-matched public college within 50 miles are less likely to mismatch in either direction. In-state tuition policies often make attending a home state college much less expensive than other options; students trade off quality for price at the margin.
Our definitions of over-and under-qualification do not presume that these forms of mismatch are bad for students. Under-qualification in particular may be beneficial since it means that students are attending higher quality colleges than they would be if they were well-matched. Over-qualification may be beneficial if students benefit from being the proverbial big fish in the small pond. In preliminary work (Dillon and Smith 2012) , we find that student ability and college quality both raise the probability of graduation and that there is little evidence of a further interaction effect between ability and quality. This parallels a finding for the 1979 NLSY cohort in Black, Daniel and Smith (2005, Were accepted to a good match but didn't attend 29.2%
22.1%
Note: Only the younger NLSY97respondents were asked questions about college applications. Of the 2,106 respondents who started at a 4-year college and for whom we have a measure of match with their college, 777 are included in these tables. Of the rest, 1,255 (94% of the missing) are excluded because they were born in 1980, 1981, or 1982 . Another 38 (3% of the missing) are ineligible for the application section for other reasons. 2% are missing because they were eligible but didn't answer any application questions and 1% answered questions, but we could match any of the schools they applied to with match measures. Both panels use inverse probability weights. characteristics of all college attendees (in the first column) and of students in each mismatch category. For example, the third row shows the percent of all students and of students in each mismatch category who are male. Numbers calculated with inverse probability of inclusion weights. Ability percentiles are among 4-year college starters, adjusted by age. In-state tuition is measured in the year each student graduated from high school, deflated to 1997 dollars. Equal to one if the respondent started college more than 12 months after finishing high school. ASVAB percentile Percentile over 4-year college starters in the NLSY97 (or all college starters for some specifications) of the first and second principal components of the 12 sections of the ASVAB test, taken by NLSY97 respondents in 1997 or 1998. High School GPA Collected from the respondent's high school transcript and standardized to a 4-point scale weighted by Carnegie credits. GPA percentile is calculated within our [weighted] sample of college-goers in the same way as the ASVAB percentile.
SAT score
The combined score on the math and verbal section of the SAT (max score 1600) or the combined math and verbal score on the ACT converted to the SAT scale using the table provided by the ACT, collected from the respondent's high school transcript. SAT percentile is calculated within our [weighted] sample of college-goers in the same way as the ASVAB percentile. Region of the U.S.
Region where the respondent lived in the fall before they finished high school. Household wealth Total 1997 household net worth for the household where the respondent lived in 1997. This number is taken from the parent survey where available and from the youth survey when the parent response is missing (98.6% from parent survey). We use total wealth across everyone living in the same household as the respondent (whether or not respondent is independent from parents in 1997). 1997 wealth quartiles are calculated within the (weighted) sample.
Household income
Total 1996 household income for the household where the respondent lived in 1997. This number is taken from the parent survey where available and from the youth survey when the parent response is missing (98.6% from parent survey). We use total income across everyone living in the same household as the respondent (whether or not respondent is independent from parents in 1997). Income quintile cutoffs are taken from the 1996 Current Population Survey Annual Social and Economic Supplement Income Percent Distribution for Families.
Parents' education
We consider the highest educational attainment of either of the respondent's resident's parents (or of the only parent in single parent households) as reported in the fall before the respondent finished high school (or earlier if that year is unavailable). We include at most one resident mother and father figure per respondent using the following prioritization: biological, adopted, step, or foster.
Log median income in census district
Log median income (from the 1990 census) in the census district where the respondent lived in 1997. % in census district with at least 4 years of college
The share of the adult (over 25) population that has at least 4 years of college (from 1990 census) in the census district where the respondent lived in 1997.
Took classes outside of school
From the 1997 youth survey. Equal to one if he or she answered yes to "In a typical week, did you spend any time taking extra classes or lessons for example, music, dance, or foreign language lessons?" Had computer at home From the 1997 youth survey. Equal to one if he or she answered yes to "In the past month, has your home usually had a computer?" Log average 4year or 2-year instate tuition.
Average in-state tuition, by year, for public four-year and two-year schools is from the State of Washington Higher Education Coordinating Board. "In-state" tuition for District of Columbia residents is calculated as max(national average in-state tuition, national average out-of-state tuition -$10,000) in accordance with DC Tuition Assistance Grant Program. For each respondent, in-state tuition is the in-state tuition in the fall before they finished high school in the state where they lived that fall. All tuition is CPIdeflated to 1997 dollars. Well-matched public or private college nearby Well-matched is defined as having a college of the relevant category whose weighted quality percentile is within 20 percentage points of the student's ASVAB ability percentile (as detailed in the text). Distance is calculated from the zipcode of the respondent's residence in the fall before they finished high school. In the 352 cases where the zipcode that fall was missing, the zipcode from the last available year prior to graduation is used. % of HS teachers with advanced degrees From the restricted NLSY97 School Survey. The response from the respondent's last high school to the survey question "what percent of your teachers have more than a bachelor degree?" % of HS class to four-year or twoyear college From the restricted NLSY97 School Survey. The response from the respondent's last high school to the survey question "by the fall following graduation, about what percent of your 1999 graduating class enrolled in a four-year (two-year) college?" Rural
Indicates that the respondent did not live within a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) in fall before they finished high school.
Note: Many variables are measured in relation to the time a respondent finished high school. This is the reported high school graduation date for high school graduates or the last month a respondent reported being enrolled in high school for respondents who did not graduate. 
